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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Juan Arellano saw his wife in a bar with another man and he shot her, resulting in
her death. Mr. Arellano pied guilty to first degree murder, admitting that he shot and
killed his wife, but refusing to state that he acted with premeditation or malice
aforethought, entering an Alford1 plea to those elements. After Mr. Arellano's unified
sentence of life, with 22 years fixed, was affirmed on direct appeal, he filed a timely
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief asserting, among other claims, that his trial counsel
failed to inform him that a homicide committed in the heat of passion is voluntary
manslaughter, not murder, and that had his attorney informed him of this, he would not
have pied guilty and would have taken his case to trial. Mr. Arellano

that the

district court erred in summarily dismissing this claim.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Juan Arellano was charged with the first degree murder of his wife, aggravated
battery, and attempted murder, all of which were alleged to be enhanced by the use of a
firearm. (R., pp.21-24.) Mr. Arellano reached an agreement with the State wherein he
would plead guilty to the first degree murder charge and the associated weapons
enhancement and would be free to argue an appropriate sentence, while the State
would dismiss the remaining charges and argue for no more than a unified sentence of

See Norlh Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) ("An individual accused of crime may
voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison
sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts
constituting the crime.").
1

1

life, with

years fixed. (R., pp.28-53.) However, when it came time to actually placing

his guilty

on the record, Mr. Arellano would not state that the shooting was

premeditated or that he acted with malice aforethought, and the parties agreed that
Mr. Arellano could enter an Alford plea to those specific elements.

(R., pp.83-88.)

Mr. Arellano was sentenced to a unified term of life, with 22 years fixed, and his
sentence was affirmed on appeal. (R,. pp.70-73, 89-97, 124-126.)
Mr. Arellano filed a timely verified Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief,
generally asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective in advising him to plead guilty.
(R., pp.5-97.)

In his petition, Mr. Arellano made the following relevant factual

assertions:
29. Petitioner asserts that he lacked the ability to act deliberately and with
violence against his wife, and the killing of his wife occurred by accident
because of the blind rage upon seeing her come back into the bar after
her lover escorted her out.
30. A jury would have been allowed to infer that the requisite mental state
was lacking on all the assault charges or he was under the influence of
two drugs and the culmination of emotions that his wife intentionally
provoked.

51. No one knows what Petitioner's intent was when he pulled out a gun
and walked out onto the dance floor. All petitioner knows is that his
emotions overwhelmed him, and [he] wanted to rant and rave.
52. Petitioner asserts her death was an accident and misfortune in the
heat of his passion as he was attempting to scare her. He never intended
to kill her, but the rage within was so overwhelming that he was out of
control and even more by the acts of others.
53. Under the professional norms, counsel's assistance amounted to
incompetence. Counsel failed entirely in his representation.
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54. Petitioner alleges he committed homicide and attempted assaults with
a weapon in the heat of passion upon the appearance of his wife as she
intentionally came back to the
55. Counsel's representation was so seriously defective he was not
functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
56. Petitioner asserts that there exist(s) a reasonable probability that but
for counsel's representation, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial.
57. Counsel's failures prejudice(d) petitioner and if he would have fulfilled
his obligations he would never have been convicted of any of the charges
filed by information.
58. Petitioner advised his attorney (of) his version of the facts surrounding
the death of his wife. Yet counsel insisted that some of those facts were
irrelevant, and that if he went to trial he would be found guilty. As a result
of counsel refusing to participate in petitioner's defense he entered a guilty
plea.
(R., pp.10, 13.) The district court granted Mr. Arellano's motion for to the appointment
of counsel. (R., pp.98-101, 111-112.)
The State filed an Answer and a motion for summary dismissal, and brief in
support, generally claiming that Mr. Arellano's claims were bare and conclusory, not
supported by admissible evidence, or should have been raised on direct appeal, and it
requested the district court to dismiss the petition. (R., pp.113-116, 120-141.) Counsel
for Mr. Arellano filed an objection to the State's motion for summary dismissal arguing,
in part, "Petitioner avers that his counsel advised him that his mental state at the time of
the alleged incident was not relevant to the case. This is clearly a significant issue that
needs to be explored to determine the validity of the Defendant's entry of his Guilty
Plea." (R., p.158 (citation omitted).)
The district court entered an order granting the State's motion for summary
disposition. (R., pp.167-184.) Regarding what the court described as Mr. Arellano's

3

claim that trial counsel "advised Mr. Arellano to plead
the State would not

'" the

able to prove the

ilty to first degree murder 'when
found the allegations were

bare and conclusory and there was sufficient evidence to convict him of murder, and
that Mr. Arellano failed to prove that his trial counsel's advice to plead guilty was
deficient "and that he suffered prejudice as a result." (R., pp.170-171.) Mr. Arellano
timely appealed from the district court's final Judgment dismissing the petition.
(R., pp.185-186, 200-203.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Arellano's claim that that his trial
counsel failed to inform him that a homicide committed in the heat of passion is
voluntary manslaughter, not murder, and that had his attorney informed him of this, he
would not have pied guilty and would have taken his case to trial?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Arellano's Claim That That His
Trial Counsel Failed To Inform Him That A Homicide Committed In The Heat Of Passion
Is Voluntary Manslaughter, Not Murder, And That Had His Attorney Informed Him Of
This, He Would Not Have Pied Guilty And Would Have Taken His Case To Trial

A.

Introduction
In his verified petition, Mr. Arellano made an un-rebutted claim that his trial

counsel failed to explain to him that a kilting conducted in the heat of passion is not
murder, and that had his trial counsel informed him of this, he would not have pied guilty
but would have taken his case to trial. As such, Mr. Arellano's claim raised a genuine
of material fact which, if resolved in his favor, would entitle him to relief.

The

district court erred in summarily dismissing this claim.

B.

Standards Of Review
A post-conviction petition initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature and, like a

plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove his or her allegations upon which the
requests for relief are based by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Yakovac,
145 Idaho 437, 443 (2008). However, unlike a plaintiff in other civil cases, the original
post-conviction petition must allege more than merely "a short and plain statement of
the claim."

Id. at 443-444.

The application must present or be accompanied by

admissible evidence supporting the allegations contained therein, or else the postconviction petition may be subject to dismissal.

Id.

In addition, the post-conviction

petition must set forth with specificity the legal grounds upon which the application is
based. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010).

6

A claim of
post-conviction

nrr,Pu,o

of counsel may properly
1

Thomas v.

Idaho

brought through

769, 185 P.3d

1,

(Ct. App. 2008). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner
must first show that trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,

760 (1988).

Where a defendant shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is

shown if there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, at 694; Aragon at
760. Where a petitioner claims that his guilty plea was induced by the erroneous advice
of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate

but for counsel's erroneous advice, the

petitioner would not have entered into the

agreement. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.

52, 59-60 (1985).
A district court may summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition only where the
petition and evidence supporting the petition fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact
that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle him or her to the relief requested.
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444.

"A material fact has 'some logical connection with the

consequential facts[,]' Black's Law Dictionary, 991 (7th Ed.1999), and therefore is
determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties." Id. On
review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary
hearing, the appellate court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file.
Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894,896 (Ct. App. 1993).
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The United

Supreme Court has defined the standard for whether there

a genuine

of material fact as whether "the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry
of determining

there is the need for a trial

whether, in other words, there are

any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at
250. If a genuine factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted.

Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444. The underlying facts alleged by the petitioner "must be
regarded as true" for purposes of summary dismissal.

Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho

250 (2009). Any disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party,
and "all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of
the non-moving party." Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009).

C.

There Was A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether Mr. Arellano's Trial
Counsel Failed To Advise Him That A Killing Done In The Heat Of Passion Is Not
Murder; Thus, The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing This Claim
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a person . . . with malice aforethought[.]"

I.C. § 18-4001.

Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a person without

malice upon a sudden quarrel of in the heat of passion. I.C. § 18-4006(1 ). Mr. Arellano
provided evidence through his verified petition that he killed his wife in the heat of
passion and that he informed his trial counsel of this; however, trial counsel told him that
it was not a defense to murder.

(R., pp.10, 13; see also R., p.158).)

Furthermore,

Mr. Arellano swore that had he known that a killing committed in the heat of passion
was not murder, he would have rejected the plea offer and would have taken his case to
trial.

Id.

Mr. Arellano's allegations were not bare and conclusory; rather, they were
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with his counsel relevant to his

sworn statements regarding his own
ineffective assistance of counsel claim

The

did not present any

contradicting Mr. Arellano's claim in support of their motion for summary dismissal. As
such, the district court erred in granting the State's motion for summary dismissal.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Arellano respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's
summary dismissal of his claim that his plea was induced by a false promise made by
his trial counsel, and remand this case for an evidentiary hearing.
DATED this 30 th day of October, 2014.

State Appellate Public Defender
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thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
JUAN MANUEL ARELLANO
INMATE #99235
ISCC
PO BOX 70010
BOISE ID 83707
MICHAEL R CRABTREE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court.

EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JCP/eas

10

